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State Capitol 
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CHAIRM~N JACK R. FENTON: The subject of today's hearing is 
the use of pre-trial screenlng panels in medical malpractice litiga-
tion. The hearing will focus on AB 2919 by Assemblyman Leroy Greene 
which would require that a medical injury claim against a physician or 
surgeon be submitted to and reviewed by a three person screening panel 
prior to a medical malpractice complaint being filed with the courts. 
Thirty states have established screening panels which re-
view and render non-binding decisions on the merits of medical mal-
practice claims prior to the action being litigated. These panels 
were conceived as a method of relieving a burden on the courts by the 
discouraging of the filing of frivilous suits and encouraging settle-
ment of meritorious ones. Nevertheless the use of screening panels 
remains controversial. 
Today, the Comittee will receive testimony on both the posi-
tive and negative aspects of medical malpractice screening procedures 
to aid us in determining whether California should also implement such 
a system. 
Our first witness is Assemblyman Leroy ~reene, who is the 
author of AB 2919. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEROY F. GREENE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As 
you indicated, the purpose of AB 2919 was to create the malpractice 
screening panels and they would have been empowered to review allega-
tions of medical malpractice ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Excuse me, I was remiss in not introducing 
the other member of the Committee who is here, Assemblywoman Jean 
Moorhead from Sacramento. Go ahead, Leroy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: In any case, what we sought was to 
create the malpractlce screening panels. They would have been empow-
ered to review allegations of malpractice in an informal setting prior 
to the filing of a lawsuit. The concept is that such a panel which 
would be composed of, in this case, it was proposed to be a judge, an 
attorney and a physician of the same specialty as the person accused 
of malpractice, that they would be able to decide the issue of negli-
gence in a fair and equitable manner and at much less cost in both time 
and dollars to both parties involved. Currently, there is no mecha-
nism for an injured party to determine if an injury is the result of 
malpractice as opposed to unsatisfactory outcome of an illness or in-
jury without going to the expense and the time involved in a civil 
suit. So, the malpractice screening panel, then, would provide such 
a determination as to whether in fact malpractice was involved at a 
much lower cost. It was presumed that the benefits of such panels to 
physicians would be similar. An expert panel could settle the question 
of negligence without the significant cost to the defendant of defend-
ing a civil suit. Under the bill that you're using as a basis of your 
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discussion, AB 2919, both the injured party and the physician would 
retain the right to a jury trial if either party chose to appeal the 
panel's decision. To keep this screening panel process from being a 
meaningless exercise, AB 2919 provides that the findings of such a 
panel shall be admissible at a subsequent trial and shall be treated 
as expert testimony by the court. 
The bill was not successful in passage so then I asked that 
AB 2919 be sent to interim study because there didn't seem to be a con-
sensus of opinion evolving as the bill was being considered. And I'm 
hopeful that this hearing will produce the information necessary to 
produce a consensus and either strengthen such weaknesses as perceived 
in the bill or else indicate once and for all that this is somethina 
that is not the suitable direction to go. I of course think it is ~uch 
a direction or I would not have put in the bill. With me today Dr. 
Marsh Steward, the immediate past president of the California Associ-
ation of Obs ians and Gynecologists. Dr. Steward is a strong 
supporter of the malpractice screening panels, as is the associat 
of physicians he represents. That's my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. 
DR. MARSH STEWARD, JR.: As Mr. Greene said, my name is 
Steward and I'm a practlclng obstetrician and gynecologist down in 
Fullerton, Californ I'm the immediate past president of the Cali-
fornia Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and I'm currently 
chairman of their malpractice committee. ~1edical malpractice today 
still constitutes in our opinion one of the major problems facing the 
medical profession. It's also in our opinion one of the factors which 
is causing the cost of medical care or health care to be priced out of 
the ordinary consumer. OB men are particularly interested in this as-
pect of medical practice because we're more like to be sued by ten 
times than any other practicing physician. We are not interested in 
to reform the entire tort system. We are not interested in 
ing the bas of jurisprudence, but we do feel that there 
are some th can be done in a small way which will improve the 
performance of the system. Assemblyman Greene's bill creating pre-
filing screening panels is one of the things that we feel can do a 
great deal. 
Pre-trial screening panels or pre-filing screening panels 
exist today in 29 of our states. They are mandatory in 19 of our 
states. I think their goals, as Assemblyman Greene said, are rela-
tively stra forward. They seek to screen out the frivolous or 
the baseless suit prior to its getting into the system and clogging 
it up. And they also would likely assist in the speedy resolution of 
those claims which are well based or well founded. Medical practice 
such a complex technical situation that very few doctors are 
able to understand all of the aspects of medicine and certainly the 
person, lay individual who is involved in this process 
sometimes completely at a loss. The patient who feels that she has 
been ured takes her complaint to an attorney who examines it for 
ial action and he really in many cases is unable to reach a de-
ion as to whether there is anything there or not. These pre-trial 
or pre-fil screen panels would be a mechanism by which he could 
get at least supposedly objective, unbiased, expert opinions which 
would examine the facts informally and say to him, "We feel that there 
is a justified cause of action here~ Or conversely, "We feel that this 
is not a matter of medical negligence." I think this would accomplisp, 
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as I said before, the weeding out of the baseless claims which are 
numerous. 
The Association of Insurance Commissioners, in its study of 
this problem, has indicated that the physician-defendant is winning 
nine out of ten of these cases which go to trial. Now either there 
are an awful lot of inept advocates or there are a lot of baseless 
suits being brought. And I think that a mechanism which would help 
to weed out these baseless suits would be of great advantage to both 
the patient, the attorney and the physicians. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Doctor, according to this bill the attor-
ney is selected by the judge from a list submitted by the local bar. 
However, if the attorney selected is a trial lawyer, we know his bent. 
If the attorney selected is a defense attorney we know his bent. How 
do we achieve impartiality in these proceedings? I assure you as an 
attorney it's sometimes impossible to be impartial. The only one that 
would be impartial, would be the judge. That part of the proposal 
bothers me. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Well, Assemblyman Fenton, the screening 
panel is a prel1minary bout to the main bout which would be a trial be-
fore the court. And what you are asking of these three people, the 
judge, the physician, and the attorney, is, "Do you think that there 
are proper grounds of malpractice?" And let us suppose that there is 
bias on the part of one or more of those three -- and therefore you 
have what might in the end prove not to be the case -- you know there's 
a bias one way or the other. There then is in the bill itself a system 
whereby if you don't agree within 60 days with the party, you can ap-
peal that as well so that ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You can appeal it? 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Yes, if the screening panel determines 
there is no liability, that determination may be reviewed by filing a 
complaint within 60 days and also the other way around. So that ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, you say the decision may be reviewed 
by filing a complaint, r1ght? Let's say I have a medical malpractice 
claim. We hold a hearing on my claim and you find my claim not to be 
meritorious. Now what you're saying is that within 60 days of that I 
have to file a normal medical malpractice lawsuit. Correct? That's 
the complaint to which you're referring. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Right. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now, how is that different from what we 
have now? From the t1me I file my complaint, what is different? 
DR. SEWARD: There's one thing ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What does this opinion do other than trig-
ger the 60 days time period? 
DR. SEWARD: Well, it is also considered germane in the case 
itself. That 1s, 1t is evidence as expert testimony in the very case 
that is before the court. So that's one thing. 
-3-
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay, that's where my talk about bias, un-
intentional b1as, bothers me. 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN GREENE: Well, whether it's intentional or unin-
tentional b1as, you know you have that at any witness in any trial, 
okay. Intentional or unintentional bias. That possibly always exists. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I presume you would not allow the plain-
tiff's attorney to call 1n the judge, to call in the doctor and to call 
in the attorney and cross-examine them on the basis of which they have 
rendered their opinion. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: I don't know the answer to that question. 
I don't know. 
DR. STEWARD: As I read the bill and as the other pre-trial 
screening panels are constituted in the other states, it is not an 
adversary proceeding. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: The opinion is just entered and the jury, 
if you have a Jury, would be given precautionary instructions that this 
is an opinion and they are to consider this as an expert opinion. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: But I don't know why you couldn't call 
them in, Jack, because the language of the bill says on page 5, line 
4, the judge who is a member of the screening panel shall not preside 
in the subsequent hearing or trial in the same case. Nothing says he 
cannot be called as a witness. Likewise, it says on line 7, 8 and 9 
on page 5 that no member of that panel shall be liable for damage for 
any acts or statements made as a member of the panel but again nothing 
suggests that the person can.not be called into the courtroom. 
DR. STEWARD: May I just interject something there. In ans-
wer to your quest1on about the inherent bias on the make-up of several 
members of the panel, I'm sure that there would be some bias built in 
as there is in any human activity, but I think there would be less bias 
in the so-called impartial objective group than there would be in the 
people directly involved in the case. In other words, there would be 
less bias on the part of the attorney who is sitting on the panel than 
there would be on the attorney representing the defendant or the attor-
ney representing the plaintiff so that attorney might be a little less 
biased. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You're talking about degrees. I'll agree 
~ith you on degrees. That's correct. 
DR. SEWAP~: And the same is true of the physician member of 
the panel. He lS not going to be as biased as the defendant's phy-
sician. He is likely to be a little more objective. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: You know, it appears though from the 
number of the states that use such screening panels in one form or 
another that there doesn't seem to have been too much concern or prob-
lem with the bias that you are suggesting because of the great number 
of states that use . What you're starting with is an over-all thing 
here that actually goes back to insurance and insurance claims, mal-
practice insurance. What you have is something that is extremely ex-
pensive and you recall of course as well as anybody, Assemblyman 
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Fenton, what happened a few years ago when it hit the fan over the mal-
practice business of physicians. So that what we're saying is okay, 
you do have a number of cases that are frivolous suits. How do you 
weed them out, decrease the cost of malpractice insurance and attempt 
at the same time to unclog some of the court calendars and the likes? 
Well, this simply says, "All right, why don't you take your first shot 
here." And if these people, if they have some bias or not, it seems 
to me that they still expect to have reasonable people here to that are 
simply being asked, "Hey, is there some merit to this claim?" 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, you have to understnad, Leroy, that 
without the opportun1ty to cross-examine, you're now going to allow 
this in as expert testimony. Normally you are allowed to cross-
examine, the people who are giving &xpert testimony. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Again, I see nothing in the bill that 
prevents that. If you could show me anything that prevents that I'd 
like to see what it is. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, you are permitting the opinion in. 
If I call a doctor, I have to call him in as my witness. In this bill 
you allow the opinion to go in period as expert testimony. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: I know but there's nothing to prevent 
you from call1ng that attorney or the doctor to ask any question you 
want as to how he reached that conclusion. The conclusion still stands 
but I don't think there's anything that prevents you from questioning 
as to how he arrived at it. 
DR. SEWARD: May I say something to that? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Sure. 
DR. SEWARD: In some states, these panels are so constituted 
that their op1n1on is not only allowed to be introduced into the trial 
as expert testimony, but it is also presumed to be correct. Now this 
is a very small minority of the panels. In most of the cases the 
findings of the panels are allowed to be introduced into the trial, 
but theirs is just as open to contesting as any other expert witness. 
CHAIID1AN FENTON: Yes, but you contest it by virtue or your 
witnesses com1ng in and giving their opinion -- not by questioning the 
judge, which I'm sure you would not be allowed to do. Ms. Moorhead 
wants to ask you a question. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN JEAN MOORHEAD: WEll, I'm confused as to a com-
ment that you made, doctor, that if somebody came to a physician and 
said, "I think we have a basis for a malpractice action," and then that 
physician needed to turn to somebody with more expertise. I didn't 
have the feeling that you meant this panel but as we've had this dis-
cussion now, I'm confused. Do you see the panel as the -- as a re-
source or,as I hear the Chairman saying, the first level of litigation? 
I'm confused. 
DR. STEWARD: I think, Ms. Moorhead, that these panels, as 
I see them at least, are both. I think they can constitute a resource 
for the injured party. If the panel looks at this problem and says, 
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"Certainly this is a case of medical negligence" then this finding is 
given to the plaintiff's counsel and the plaintiff,under the rules 
of most of these panels, would be able to draw on the experts consti-
tuting the panel, or other medical experts furnished by the society to 
support that contention. So it would allow, for instance, a small in-
jury which today if it's $25,000 or less will never see the light of 
day because the costs are too much to get it into the system, it would 
allow a case like that to be settled in favor of the plaintiff with 
much more ease. So they do constitute a resource. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Actually, the screening panel says yes 
or no to a quest1on. And the question is was there malpractice in-
volved? 
DR. SEWARD: Whether there was any negligence. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Yes, whether there was any negligence. 
And the only th1ng that screening panel says in the end is yes or no. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Leroy, it's very important when you're sit-
ting there with a jury, and you bring in some testimony and you say, 
"Some panel of experts has decreed that there's no negligence here" --
that's a very potent thing ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: I find nothing that prevents you from 
questioning those people. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If you're saying that you're going to bring 
this legislat1on again and you're going to amend it to say that this 
opinion will be admitted as any other expert testimony, and the experts 
will be there to be cross-examined by the other party, that's something 
else. But you know that's not going to happen because the judge isn't 
going to be there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: I see nothing in the bill that prevents 
it now. If you can show me something about this bill that says you 
can't cross-examine ... 
CHAIRM&~ FENTON: Leroy, the way trials work is that if I have 
an expert, I would put him on the stand and then the defense attorney, 
would have the opportunity,at the time the jury hears his testimony, 
to cross-examine him. Remember they hear the experts testimony and 
they hear the cross-examination, and then in their minds they make 
their own determination. Okay? 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now what you're doing is you're taking a 
document or an op1n1on from three people and you're saying to the jury, 
"Here is a panel experts made up of a doctor, a lawyer, and a judge, 
who have determined that there is or isn't any negligence." Now the 
jury doesn't have the opportunity ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: No, you put the period there. I find 
nothing in this bill that prevents you from calling on those witnesses. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Leroy, well calling on them is one thing, 
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but going through the process of how they make their determination is 
something entirely different. If we're going to take the three members 
of the panel and examine them and grant the other side the right to 
cross-examination, then you're not going to save any time in the proc-
ess. Now the arbitration process that we've got going, if it works, 
will save a lot of time. If you're going to allow us to examine the 
panel in the normal fashion of bringing them into court and then treat-
ing them as regular experts then, except for the fact that some cases 
may not have been filed within sixty days, I can't see how you are 
going to save any time. I can't see what you've accomplished. I under-
stand the problem with medical malpractice. We're having a problem with 
attorney malpractice. It's getting to be just as bad as medical mal-
practice. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: And I can see why . 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I don't quarrel with you. You're quarrel~ 
ing with the wrong person. The medical malpractice problem is+ caused 
by a lot of doctors and attorneys. And attorney malpractice is caused 
by attorneys. There are attorneys involved in medical malpractice and 
there are doctors involved in medical malpractice, but since doctors 
don't practice law, they're not involved in attorney malpractice. I 
agree with you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: I stated, Assemblyman Fenton, the over-
whelming major1ty of all such malpractice cases are won by physicians. 
The question then is ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, no. You're talking about those which 
go to trial. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Correct. Now comes the question, if 
ninety percent of those that go to trial are won by physicians, then 
isn't there a question of how many of them are actually still frivolous 
suits? And can we, by this divice -- by this screening device, de-
crease the number that are going to appear on that court calendar with-
out regard to how much effort there is in the courtroom. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I'm not an expert trial lawyer, but I 
would say expert tr1al lawyers will not take a frivolous suit that is 
going to take them a long time. You're assuming that all of your 
ninety percent are frivolous suits. I won't buy that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: No, I'm not making any such presumption, 
Jack. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I would guess that most of your ninety 
percent are usually your big cases. I can't say all of them but most 
of them are cases that there is no way that they could settle before-
hand. I imagine, a good number of them are very serious cases where 
the insurance companies and the doctors say he wasn't negligent and 
they won't offer enough to settle. The other party believes he is 
worth the gamble. I don't know, Leroy. What I'm trying to say to 
you is, from my viewpoint, you've got to find some way to deal with 
the admission of the opinion as expert testimony. Under existing law, 
if I call an expert in, I've got to pay him. He becomes my witness 
now. If the other side calls a witness in and he says things that 
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are wrong, I can challenge him. If you just let the opinion in you 
have got to give the other side the right to challenge it by calling 
all the panel into court. But if you go through the whole procedure 
what have you accomplished. Ms. Moorhead. 
ASSEMBLYWm1AN MOORHEAD: Well, he said that 19 states have 
this ... 
CHAIID1AN FENTON: Thirty states. 
ASSEMBLYWO~.A.N MOORHEAD: Well, he said 19. 
DR. STEWARD: Twenty-nine had them. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD: Twenty-nine had them and it's man-
.datory in 19. Okay, what do they do? Can we benefit from what's 
happening there? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, first you've got to understand that 
four of these have been declared unconstitutional. As I understand 
from the Committee counsel, the reason is that there have been a lot 
of administrative delays and therefore the court ruled that these pro-
cedures were unconstitutional. The procedures were taking away the 
rights of individuals to due process because of the delays. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD: Well, in the 19 states, is there any 
one that has something like what this legislation would establish? 
DR. STEWARD: Yes. There are a number -- among the 29 states 
which have pre-trlal screening panels, 19 of them are mandatory and 
pre-filing. That means before the case has gotten into the mechanism. 
CHAiru1AN FENTON: Like you're proposing here? 
DR. STEWARD: Yes. 
CHAiru1AN FENTON: The other 11 allow screening after filing? 
DR. STEWARD: After the action has been filed, and some 
either before or after. The mechanism among the states varies tre-
mendously and the composition of the panel varies tremendously. In 
some states there have been seven-member panels. The majority of those 
were too unwieldy and they found that they were really not doing much 
of anything. Where they have been most successful, they have been con-
stituted of three individuals, most of the time a doctor, a lawyer, 
and a judge or a lay person other than a doctor or a lawyer. In those 
cases, for instance Wisconsin, they have been credited with elimi-
nating from the system 15 out of 20 cases. Now that doesn't mean that 
they were deciding favor of the defendant in 15. But they were re-
solving 15 of the 20 cases. Which is a three-fifths reduction in load 
on the court system. And this can't help but be beneficial all the 
way around. 
ASSEMBLYWm1AN MOORHEAD: So this legislation is patterned 
after what you feel is a success in other states? 
DR. STEWARD: Yes. 
-8-
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD: Thank you. 
CHAIIDlAN FENTON: ~lliat happens now if your panel says there 
is negligence? what do we do now? 
DR. STEWARD: If the panel says there is negligence, then the 
plaintiff's attorney has the option of saying to the defendant, "Your 
experts have said that this is malpractice. Do you want to settle?" 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now as far as the plaintiff is concerned 
we haven't changed anything other than issued an opinion. You don't 
automatically say to the plaintiff, "The negligence issue has been 
resolved. Now when we go to trial, all we're going to try is the 
amount of damages." 
DR. STEWARD: No. The findings of the committee are not 
binding on elther s1de. They are not findings as to liability. Now 
in some cases -- in some states they are constituted so that they are 
empowered to decide liability as well as right or wrong. But in 
Assemblyman Greene's bill ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Wait a minute, Doctor, let me interrupt 
you. You're say1ng now this panel doesn't decide liability. You 
said earlier the panel decides where there was negligence. When they 
decide negligence aren't they deciding liability in effect? 
ASSE!I1BLYMAN GREENE: I think you misspoke. You confused 
damages with negligence. 
DR. STEWARD: Damages is what I meant to say. In some states 
the panel is ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Also decides the amount of damages. Okay. 
DR. STEWARD: But not in the one that is proposed here. So 
to answer your question, if the panel says, "Yes,there is liability," 
the plaintiff's attorney can then go to the defendant and say, "We 
have a case of obvious malpractice. Do you want to enter into an 
equitable settlement?" And perhaps they can enter into an·_equitable 
settlement. 
CHAirulAN FENTON: Well, if we are trying the cases out of 
the mainstream of the system of the judicial system, why don't you 
amend your bill to say if negligence is found that the same panel makes 
a determination as to the amount of damages? Why not? 
DR. STEWARD: There are various objections to this and this 
particular power of the panel has been attacked in a number of juris-
dictions on the basis that it is usurping a judicial prerogative. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: So you're doing the same thing by deter-
mining negligence? 
DR. STEWARD: No. You're simply being a group expert witness. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: But what I'm saying is, if the medical 
profession is going to say that it wants a pre-screening panel to 
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decide if there is negligence, to help the system of jurisprudence, 
then to be consistent, it would seem to me, you should let the panel 
issue an opinion as to the amount of damages. That will help settle 
things. I assure you it will help settle things. 
DR. STEWARD: I would be against that, Mr. Fenton, on this 
basis. I th1nk amounts of compensation are well within any lay per-
son's ability to make a value judgment. Where I think the medical mal-
practice problem bogs down is that we're expecting lay people to judge 
the scientific facts of the case. And I think in most cases this is 
difficult for them. So, I think to give the panel the power to decide 
damages is a function it doesn't need. I think ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let me ask you this. We're in a medical 
malpractice case now, the plaintiff has to have some medical evidence, 
and usually it's through a doctor, that the person who provided the 
medical service was negligent. Am I correct? 
DR. STEWARD: No. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You don't have an expert opinion on both 
sides, right? 
DR. STEWARD: Not at this point in time. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, no. Forget that. Let's talk about 
our present system for the moment. 
DR. STEWARD: Well that's what I'm talking about. In our 
present system all that is necessary is for a patient who feels that 
he or she has been injured, to take her case to an attorney. At that 
point he files an action ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, no. We're in court now. Listen to 
me, Doctor. We're 1n court now. We've gone through everything and 
we can't settle the case. Now we're trying the case and I'm the plain-
tiff's attorney. Don't I bring medical experts in to show negligence? 
DR. STEWARD: Yes. 
CHAIIDffiN FENTON: All right. You as a defendant bring in 
your experts. Now you're saying to me, in answer to my question, "Lay 
people on the jury can't determine scientific matters." Well, neither 
can the professionals. Because what you've got not is experts that 
are saying, "Yes, there was negligence" and experts saying, "No, there 
wasn't." Somebody now has to make a determination as the what we call 
question of fact, as to whether there was or wasn't negligence. What 
makes the lay person in the jury any less able to do that than a pro-
fessional as long as you have expert opinion on both sides? 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Mr. Fenton, aren't you changing the 
character of the screen1ng panel? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, forget the screening panel. I'm not 
quarreling w1th that, Leroy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: No. On this point. The nature of the 
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screening panel is that it renders its opinion to the court, you know, 
whether something went wrong or didn't and then it backs away. It is 
not interfering with the court's structure and the court system. I'm 
not telling the court that therefore you are to find the man guilty. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Leroy, I understand that, but the Doctor 
said that one of the reasons for this new procedure was that people 
are not capable of making sc ific dec ions. And I said in your 
normal malpractice case, there is no scientific decision that has to 
be made by a lay person. They have to believe one set of experts or 
they have to believe another set of experts. You don't have to be a 
scientist and you don't have to be a medical expert to believe one or 
the other. That's what I was saying. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Let's agree that that's true. Let's 
agree that that's true. And let's put it aside and say that you're 
right and the Doctor, 's say, was wrong, but here we are again. 
In that courtroom what have you got? You've got an opinion, an expert 
opinion, okay? It's brought into the courtroom and left sitting there 
on the table-- do with what you will, ... 
CHAI~mN FENTON: No. You have to take the context of my 
discussion with the Doctor. I'm not quarreling with your pre-screen-
ing. What I said to the Doctor was that as long as the prescreening 
panel determines liability, why can't they give an opinion as to darn-
ages? And he said, if I remember correctly, "That the lay person could 
determine the amount of damages but can't determine whether somebody 
is or isn't negligent." And that's the point of the discussion we're 
having now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: It seems to me the issue is whether 
there is or there isn 1 t some form of negligence on the of the 
physician. The purpose of the screening panel is to try to answer that 
question yes or no. And that's it. Other than that we have no desire 
to interfere with the current court system. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, we're not interfering. The Doctor 
says what he's try1ng to do is unclog the courts and keep cases that 
shouldn't be in court out of the system. That will help the court 
system as well as help the medical profession. I agree with that. 
DR. STEWARD: As well as helping the patient. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Right. And I say as long as you're going 
to take th1s pre-screen1ng opinion and let it in as expert testimony 
as to liability, then let's let them do it as to damages too. That's 
all I say. I'm not quarreling with him. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: In a very simple answer, no. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Of course, I understand. Go ahead Ms. 
Moorhead. I 1m just trying to be logical. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD: I was just going to make a comment. 
If you did all of that then you haven't changed a lot. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Oh yes you have. Let's say this bill 
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passes and it allows the opinion of the screening panel in as expert 
testimony as to two things, whether there was liability and the amount 
of damages. I assure you you'll have settlements and a reduction of 
cases filed. Because if these three people say, "There's negligence 
in the amount of $50,000," and the insurance company made a previous 
determination that they only wanted to settle for $30,000, I assure 
you that $50,000 will be reconsidered. That's what Leroy's talking 
about. The opinion is going to be very persuasive in the trial. 
There's no reason it shouldn't be. If you want the expert opinion as 
to negligence to be persuasive, why shouldn't you also allow them to 
determine the amount of damages? And he's right, from his point of view 
to say, "We don't want it." I understand that. Go ahead, Doctor. 
DR. STEWARD: Well, I think that in only a very small minor-
ity of the other states which have these panels is the panel empowered 
to decide damages. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, we always pride California on being 
a leader. Maybe 1f that's good, maybe we should take your concept 
and carry it to its proper conclusion. c~ ahead. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: We're about thirteenth in funding edu-
cation. Don't tell me about leadership. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, there's no question as I was saying to 
the media before, that we have a prbblem, particularly in Los Angeles 
County. I think their is still a three to five year wait to bring 
civil cases to trial. These cases do clog up calendars. We are al-
ways looking for ways to improve the situation. I'm sure somebody is 
going to talk about whether the arbitration system that we passed is 
going to help or not. I do sympathize. Let me say that in 30 years 
of practice I've had about three malpractice cases and they were all 
good ones. In fact that were so good I had to refer them to an attor-
ney who knew what he was doing. I'd always go to a doctor friend of 
mine and ask him what he thought. As soon as he told me he thought 
it was bad, I had my own screening panel, I just wouldn't handle it. 
But that's my own opinion. 
DR. STEWARD: Another facet of this problem, at least ac-
cording to the study done by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, is that only 16 cents out of every premium dollar is 
getting to the injured patient. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You're talking to a man who carried no-fault 
-- I used to argue that all the time. 
DR. STEWARD: The other 84 cents is going someplace else. 
CHAIR}~N FENTON: You're talking to the wrong person when 
you say that. That was my argument a long time ago. Is it 16 cents? 
I think we used to say it was even less than that when we were pushing 
no-fault. Leroy was one of my main sponsors. 
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Jack, I had malpractice before you did. 
I had the same bill you're talking about, no-fault. Then you got to 
be Chairman of the committee. 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, and then we got it out. Go ahead, 
Doctor. 
DR. STEWARD: Well ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I think you have a problem. I think you 
have a concept that should be looked into to see if something could be 
done which would be equitable.for both sides. That would do two things. 
One, it would help the administration of justice and, two, it would help 
the whole medical malpractice field. What you're saying is right but 
I don't know how you do it. If you could get rid of the nuisance 
cases ... 
DR. SEWARD: Where I think the pre-screening panels would 
offer their best services would be to eliminate the nuisance cases. 
Now you made a statement a few minutes ago that the accomplished trial 
lawyer probably doesn't bring frivolous or baseless cases. Now this 
is true. The expert ... 
CHAIRM~N FENTON: He doesn't have time. 
DR. STEWARD: The expert in malpractice ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: He's got enough good ones. 
DR. STEWARD: Right. He is not going to bring those. But 
the big problem 1s the young attorney who gets out of law school. And 
he doesn't have anything else to do and he files five malpractice 
cases. We find frequently the cases being filed before the records 
are even gotten from the hospital or from the doctor's office. Now, 
certainly, that case has not been screened. And these medical mal-
practice panels would serve this young attorney well in that respect. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much. 
DR. STEWARD: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you, Leroy. Doctor Berggreen. 
DR. RAYMOND BERGGREEN: I'm here, Mr. Chairman, really as an 
individual not tak1ng a part1cular position, although I have some 
opinions that I would like to state. I'm a physician licensed to prac-
tice in Iowa and California. I'm a member of the California and Nevada 
bars. I've had some four years experience under the Nevada program 
and I've handled cases in Arizona and I believe I'm competent to ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Are you a defense attorney. 
DR. BERGGREEN: I did plaintiff's medical malpractice for 
about 10 years. Now, for the last four years I've been doing primarily 
defense. In Nevada, I handled both plaintiff and defense cases before 
the screening panels. I also wrote a paper on alternative methods of 
handling malpractice cases that somehow never got published for the 
University of San Francisco. But I believe one of the members of the 
Senate has a copy of that. I have some opinions generally on screening 
panels. I have some opinions specifically on AB 2019. I believe, as 
written, it's a very poor piece of legislation for a number of reasons 
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that I hope to get into. Mr. Lopez was kind enough to send a letter 
that had some Committee guidelines on the points that he believed the 
Committee was interested in. And referring to that in a paragraph by 
paragraph method, I think under his first paragraph as to whether or 
not there are problems existing in malpractice, it probably requires 
candor to acknowledge, and I feel the Committee would agree, that this 
gets to the Committee because it's a dollar problem for physicians and 
a dollar problem for carriers. They look at this as some way to re-
solve those problems. And it does in a number of ways. As a practical 
matter these screening panels add about a year to the litigation proc-
ess in Nevada. From the time you file the claim until your panel has 
heard it and until you le your complaint, about a year has expired. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Does that waive the statute of limitations 
when you ... 
DR. BERGGREEN: The statute of limitations is tolled during 
that period, 1n Nevada. But in essence it allows the carriers to 
hold their money for another year. They've increased their profit 
by that amount. In addition, in that period of time from the filing 
to trial, a number of plaintiffs have died, for example. So it s a 
benefit to the defendants or the carriers. Basically, it is another 
manifestation of the fact that the medical profession, with some justi-
fication, feels that it should judge itself. As you've heard testi-
mony already, they don't feel that lay people are capable of judging 
the complicated medical issues that appear before juries at trial. 
And in the bill as presented here, it's the single M.D. as-
pect of the bill that I think is most objectionable. You're going to 
end up with one doctor of questionable bias, of questionable expertise 
on the subject, who will in effect carry the issue of liability to his 
non-medical panel members. will turn to him to say, "Was the 
operation indicated? Was it technically performed? We don't under-
stand. You're our " So you have a single doctor who's going 
to carry that, and I think that it is eminent unfair. 
The only thing really wrong with the existing court pro-
cedures, if you look at it from the physician's standpoint, is the 
size of the verdict. Most of the cases, as you know, are settled 
out of court. You've heard th testimony that n out of ten cases 
that go to verdict are won by the doctors and that's some evidence 
that there are a lot of frivolous claims filed. Well, six percent 
of the tort cases that are ever filed ever go to trial. Most of them, 
as you know, are settled before trial. And those ten cases that ulti-
inately get to trial are those where there a genuine dispute on the 
of damages. It isn't that they're frivolous because all those 
cases go to trial with expert testimony so somebody thinks there is 
some negligence. The fact that the nine out of ten go for the physi-
cians is indication of perhaps a number of things. Perhaps the respect 
with which the medical profession is held by members of the public. 
But as a practical matter, if you re trying so few of them the burden 
of medical malpractice cases per se in trial is not all that great on the 
system. You're right. Down in L. A. County they have their problems 
getting to trial. As a matter of fact, in the Central District you 
can't get a case out to trial unless you're building up to the five 
year statute. But that is not primarily the result of the number of 
medical malpractice cases being filed. And I don't think that the 
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system or that the 1 
on the system itself. 
ion involved in these cases is the burden 
Under pa two of Mr. z's request for comments, the 
issue w;w whPther or no I w:u'l econom i 1 ins 1 such proqn1m. 
I think the answer is it' economical on to the extent that it bene-
fits the defendants and their carr Obvious adds a great deal 
of time and expense to the aintiff and other to have 
to go through this procedure and the time involved is a considerable 
burden. As I indicated, Nevada it adds about a year. 
The third paragraph had to do with the ues. There 
are two of them. In the first place can't be on the defend-
ant, even though you get the issue of damages dec the screening 
panel. It's not bind The doctor will say that under the Sixth 
Amendment he's entitled to be tried by a jury of his peers. So that 
except for the pressure of having had a panel verdict against him 
there's no compulsion to pay money. And even in Nevada where we have 
had an occasional verdict by the panel that was favorable to the plain-
tiff it has been necessary to file the case and go through all the 
things that you would have done otherwise. Do your discovery. Do 
your negotiations and ultimately settle The that you go be-
fore the panel and get a verdict and go with your open hand and they 
will pay you, is nonsense. I think the most important legal issue, 
and it has been decided in some other states, is as to whether or not 
it's constitutional. There is an excellent Fourteenth Amendment--
equal protection argument against these things, that the plaintiff who 
has been injured by a doctor is required to go through these steps, 
pay these costs and take this additional time when another plaintiff 
who has been injured by a negligent automobile driver, isn't required 
to do all that. And that's the basis on which these plans have failed 
in the other states. And I have serious doubts as to what a California 
court would do with that argument if were raised. 
The fourth paragraph was what's done in other states. In 
Nevada it's a six-member panel. They have three doctors and three 
lawyers. One of the problems with it is no pre-hearing discovery is 
allowed. So in essence you file a claim based on what the plaintiff 
says. You get the medical records and you go in and in two or three 
hours in an evening, attempt to try a case that would take you three 
weeks in court, because you've done no discovery. The virtue of it 
was that if the pla iff succeeded in winning a decision that the 
county medical soc would provide him with an expert witness in 
case the case went to trial. The findings of the panel would not be 
admissible. But if you won, they said, "i>Je' 11 give you a doctor." 
As a practical matter, if you win your case and go to the county medi-
cal society and say, "Look, I won. Give me a doctor to testify," 
what you hear more often than not is, "Well, we can't find anybody who 
will come in and testify for you." So in essence, you're back where 
you were before, to square one. You file your claim. You've waited 
a year, then you get your result whatever it is. You file your com-
plaint. You do your discovery. You get your own witnesses. You com-
plete your own negotiations. And then you go to trial. You've done 
nothing except waste the time and what money it has taken in that in-
volvement. You still have to file in court. You still have to do your 
discovery. You still have to get your expert witnesses. 
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The panel proceedings, as I said, are inadmissible for any 
purpose. One of the problems that has arisen is, as I say, we can't 
do pre-trial discovery. In essence when you take the defendant doctor 
before the panel and question him to lay out your case, you are in 
effect taking his deposition. So that if vou proceed with the case 
later, he has had his deposition taken once. He knows the questions 
you are going to aSk him, he's fully prepared. Because the-proceed-
ings of the panel aren't admissible, if he changes his testimony, as 
he frequently does, there is no way you can go back and say, "But 
doctor, at the screening panel you said thus and so and now you testi-
fy in this way," because whatever happened in the panel isn't admiss-
ible. 
Arizona, as was set forth in the letter from the Judicial 
Council, is a little better I think. Arizona has a panel that has, I 
think, three doctors and three lawyers and a judge. They allow full 
discovery before the matter goes before the panel. So you take your 
depositions. You do your interrogatory. But when it's all done in 
essence you do what you do before trial in California. Most of the 
cases that I've handled in Arizona are settled or otherwise disposed 
of, without ever going before the screening panel. So that it exists 
as a threat, for whatever that's worth, and there the findings of the 
panel are admissible. They are not admissible as expert testimony 
but the jury may give it whatever weight they choose to. They are in-
formed that it has been heard by a panel of doctors and lawyers and 
they found thus and so. But to admit it as expert testimony is some-
thing else. But as a practical matter the existence of the panel in 
Arizona has really done nothing to change the time or the course of 
the litigation. You file your claim. You do your discovery. You 
engage in negotiations. Most of them are settled or otherwise dis-
posed of. And in my experience it has been a rare one that has had to 
go before the screening panel. So if you are looking for a way to 
develop a panel and to use it, I think the criteria and the structure 
of the Arizona panel and its use is certainly far better than what 
they use in Nevada and infinitely better than what's been proposed 
in AB 2919. 
I think AB 2919 is bad in general because I don't think it 
would stand against the equal protection argument. I think it is bad 
specifically because the plaintiff has to file a claim but there's 
nothing in it that the defendant has to provide an answer. So you go 
into your hearing without knowing what position the defendant is going 
to take on it. In the second place, it excludes hospitals and other 
health care providers. So if the plaintiff has got a case that involves 
~egligence on the part of a hospital and negligence on the part of a 
doctor, he's got to bifurcate it and try this one case against the 
doctor, even though the hospital may be involved, before the screening 
panel and then, depending on the result, try to combine that in a case 
in court against the hospital. Now, we are faced with that problem 
already in California where we have compulsory arbitration against 
certain individuals. For example, in SoutP.ern California all Kaiser 
cases have to be arbitrated. If you have a case that involves care at 
Kaiser and then they go to another hosptial and you contend that there 
is negligence on the part of both of them, and it happens frequently, 
you have to arbitrate your case against Kaiser, and you have to file 
vour case in court against the other ,defendants and somehow divide 
them both and make one case out of it. It's a terribly difficult 
-16-
thing. I think in the future will have to be done about 
that. But if you add to that problem by requiring that doctors have 
to go before a screening panel and the other people don't, you've 
added to that sea of problems. My third cr icism is the use of a 
single physician on the As I've said before, becomes the 
expert for them. Fourth, that the scope of discovery in this bill 
isn't set out at all And f fth, because of the that you 
have to file within 60 it's an attempt, an unwarranted 
and perhaps unconstitutional attempt, to further limit the stature of 
limitations as it applies to medical malpractice cases. The attempts 
have been made and actual been successful to some extent in constric-
ting that in the Keene bill. And each year we face additional limi-
tations on that. And I think to further limit that in this legislation 
would be unfair and unwarranted. I have nothing further. 
CHAIRJVJAN FENTON: Ms. Moorhead want's to ask a question. 
ASSEMBLY\II]OMl\N HOORHEAD: I'm interested in the time frame 
that you were talking about because, as you , there is such a 
length of time in this state before one goes to trial, and I was con-
fused over the year. Did you say that it adds an additional year in 
Nevada? 
MR. BERGGREEN: As a practical matter ... 
ASSEMBLYWOHAN MOORHEAD: And how does Arizona differ from 
Nevada? 
MR. BERGGREEN: Well, as a practical matter, in Nevada, you 
file your claim before the screening panel and then the screening panel 
gives you a date. Because there have been so many cases filed, they 
just can't find members of the screening panel to hear these things 
and because six people are involved it takes a time to find a 
night, and these are held in the evenings, when the screening panel 
can act. So there are postponements and continuances. And as a mat-
ter of practical -- for all practical purposes, the time you file 
until you have your and you get the result of your hear 
a year has passed. Now, in that year vou have done nothing. You 
can't take depositions. You can't engage in discovery. You can't 
really engage in negotiations. Nothing has happened. So, you've 
wasted a year. You the result of your screening panel and then you 
file your case in court and you proceed as vou would otherwise. So 
you've added a year to that time. 
Now in Arizona, you file your case before the screening 
panel. You are allowed to do your normal discovery and everything 
proceeds as it would if the case had been filed in court, except that 
what you are aiming for is ultimately a date before the screening panel 
rather than a trial date. So having done your normal discovery, having 
engaged in your normal negotiations based on that, the chances are that 
this would be one of the nine out of ten cases that will be settled or 
otherwise disposed of without the necessity of a hearing. So you haven't 
wasted that time. You can use that time for the normal discovery pro-
cedures that you would do in a superior court case in California. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HOORHEAD: So if you had less panelists and 
they were able to do more, would you think there was any merit to this 
proposal? 
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MR. BERGGREEN: Less panelists may be of some importance. I 
had a suggest1on, really, that I thought it might be wise if you were 
seriously interested in it and you thought that there was enough of a 
problem that it would be of acute importance to do something about it, 
it would be wise to expend some funds to establish a pilot program in 
one or two of the counties in California where we're having most of 
our problems in getting these cases to trial. It should only be used 
in cases where all the defendants are physicians, so you don't have 
this mixture that would compound it. If you've got a case against a 
doctor and a hospital that wouldn't apply. I think the panel should 
probably consist of two lawyers and two doctors, but that each side 
should have the opportunity to select its own. In Nevada they are 
selected at random from the list of the medical society. You never 
know who you're going to get. You can get some real turkeys, maybe 
somebody that you've sued. Although you have a chance to bump them, 
you very frequently end up with some pretty hostile panel members. 
But if the defendant selected a member from the medical profession 
and the plaintiff selected a member and each side selected a lawyer, 
I know you would end up with four. Ideally you should have five if 
you are going to decide it but I have a further point to make. I 
think you should allow full discovery before the panel proceeds to 
trial, then and only then would you use the unanimous verdict of the 
panel to be admissible in evidence. If they divided on it or if they 
went three-two, maybe there would be sufficient dispute as to the 
merit and it should be decided by a jury. But if you had a unanimous 
verdict in a case where full discovery had proceeded and the matter 
was heard before a panel where a reasonable lack of bias was assured 
by the use of the panel members that had been selected by each side, 
I think there is a reasonable chance that the screening panel would 
work. You still have the delay, you still have the constitutional 
arguments, but if you're going to put a panel together it should in-
clude some of the safeguards I believe that we've discussed. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ~100RHEAD: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you, Doctor. Very enlightening. 
Jerry Wilson -- not here? Okay, Ed Kerry. 
MR. EDGAR KERRY: Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Ed Kerry, represent1ng the Judicial Council. Thank you for the oppor-
tunity to express our views on this particular proposal. The comments 
that I'm about to make are not be be construed as indicating opposition 
to the concept of screening cases in some fashion. I would like to 
turn specifically to the questions that are raised by the Committee 
Counsel in the analysis. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Do you want your letter dated October 10 
to be part of the record, Ed?l 
MR. KERRY: Please. I would certainly appreciate that and 
I am simply go1ng to highlight that so you can follow along if you like. 
The question I would like to begin with is question number two here, 
raised by the Committee, "Would the screening of malpractice claims 
be a more economical method of handling malpractice cases?" Our feeling 
l Appendix A 
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is that it would not be a more economica method for four reasons. 
The first reason is s that this bill an entirely new 
procedure which is over and above the existing judicial process. It 
is not in lieu of. And this is a fa expensive procedure but I'll 
defer the cost comment for a few moments. So we're talking about set-
ting up a non-judie 1 where requests for panel determinations 
have to be filed. No question as to whether or not that is a first 
paper of filing in terms of the court's reaction to it. There are 
notices that have to be served, the other ies have to be noticed, 
the other party has the opportunity to respond to that. There have 
to be lists developed and maintained of both attorneys and doctors. 
Those people have to be selected. You have pre-hearing discovery, 
which we think will be very extensive. And you also have, of course, 
the deliberations by the panel itself. That is a very cos process, 
and that is over and above the existing process. That's the first con-
cern that we have that leads us to the conclusion that this would be 
less economical . 
The second one here is the issue of discovery. 
note, this bill imposes a new standard of discovery. It 
restrictive than discovery rights in exis California 
that that is going to result in extensive law and motion 
to what is permissible to be discovered and what not. 
to duplicate existing discovery. This does not subst 
covery which will be post filing. 
As you may 
is much more 
law. We think 
practice as 
That's going 
for dis-
The third point we raise here is simply that you have an 
existing arbitration system in California. It is mandatory for speci-
fied types of cases, $15,000 or less. If the plaintiff opts to go to 
arbitration and agrees that the disposition will not exceed $15,000, he 
can also take it to arbitration. Th dupl , in essence, the 
actions of the arb ion panel for those types of cases. 
The final point I want to make on this ion 2a is that 
something in the neighborhood of 6 percent of the total PI cases, and 
that includes these types of cases medical malpractice, go to trial, 
only 6 percent of the cases. In the other 94 percent of the cases, 
there is very little judicial activity, court act judge time in-
volved. This proposal requires in that 94 percent wh currently 
have very little judicial activity, that extensive activity result by 
involving the clerks office, by involving the judge. We think that 
that doesn't make a lot of sense and that is indeed a very costly 
propOsition. 
The second question here that I would like to respond to was 
question 2b, and I have broken this down because in your memo you've 
got about five questions lumped together in the second paragraph, 
"'V-7ha t costs would be involved in using a pre-trial screening process? u 
The first cost that we see is the cost of setting up this new system. 
Now the existing arbitration system, our experience tells us, results 
in a cost of approximately $25 per case that goes to arbitration. 
This is the purpose of selecting that panel, of dealing with chal~ 
langes to the members, of the paperwodk, back and forth. This bill re-
quires some additional input in the sense that you've got the pre-
hearing discovery matters and we think a reasonable cost figure here 
would be $30 per case. Now, in 1979, there were approximately 8,000 
cases filed against physicians and surgeons. If you multiply that out 
by $30 per case in terms of the administrative costs, you are talking 
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about roughly a 
item. 
of a mill dollars that the cost 
The next cost re to the j his capac as 
an arb , determinat on these questions. We 
think it is very like you are go to have extensive , be-
cause nobody th new standard is. But in terms the 
bill provides, you are talk about a different standard. Let me read 
from the bill for just a moment if I may, "It is the intent of the 
Legislature that hear and re in-
formal and therefore that ted to such matters 
as are probably necessary for sage it is very 
likely that you may have a law in every e case. 
If that is true, we are ta about an ave cost in with 
discovery law and motion ssues of $15 to 22 per case, under ex 
calendars. Us the same e , we are talk about a claim of 
between $120,00 and 7 0 lars per year for of it. 
The next is ion, that is the 's delib-
eration lf. Our in arbitra ion indicates that it takes 
one to two hours for the arbitrator to reach a as to the 
issues of liabil and of course the r under the ex ing 
system also deals the question of amount. proposal of course 
deals with more cumbersome of and 
that the 
pres 
are talk 
summary 
between 
screen 
are 
takes one hour this panel to reach a 
our is that s means $816,000 in costs. 
$1. million. And I would 
It notes that the de-
or absence of liabil , yet 
f a int is f sub-
f the shall be 
is to come up with find-
extensive re-
per panel 
cost to 
one last factor and that is 
in a cannot 
same case, so there 
into cons 
tria we are 
of cases from 
to another court 
case, 
result in an ass 
So the total cost 
irman, of the bill, is 
a cost factor. 
, you 
on 
e 
the courts by pre-trial screening?" And I would like to combine that 
with the question number three on legal issues. We feel there are 
substantial additional burdens that are placed upon the courts under 
this proposed system. The first I would call to your is 
this, this bill says that a clerk cannot file a case, if it falls into 
a number of different categories. Clerks perform minister functions. 
They do not perform discretionary functions. This bill would appear to 
require the clerk to begin reading every single action that is filed to 
make a decision as to whether it falls into these categories. And if 
it falls into each of these specified groups, it cannot be filed. 
Query, does that raise the 1 lity question? What if the clerk is 
wrong? Basically, the clerk does not have the training or skills to 
make this kind of a legal discretionary judgment. 
The next question here which we think very, very signi-
ficant, is a constitutional issue but it is not the one that you have 
already heard about. This is the notion that s bill requires the 
establishment of an entirely new nonjudicial system and yet look who 
is responsible for carrying out all of the actions under this system; 
it is the judicial branch of government. We think that that is simply 
unconstitutional as it requires the judicial branch of government to 
be involved in nonjudicial activities. It requires a lot of judge 
time, and a lot of clerk time. 
Another issue we think ought to be raised here is that this 
type of a request is filed with the clerk. Immedia not with-
standing the condition of the calendar, you may have cases backlogged 
for two, three, or five years. The judge has to immediately extricate 
himself and become involved in a nonjudicial process, leaving all of 
these other cases behind in order to move toward an advisory opinion 
that this panel is going to give. That is a s ficant issue. This 
category of potential litigants is given a tremendous advantage in 
terms of receiving an advisory opinion, everything else s re-
quired to stay still. Query, what will the impact of that be on 
existing court calendars? 
The converse argument that has been made is of course the 
equal protection argument in terms of requiring this category of 
litigants to go through these additional processes. Three additional 
points only, and some of them are a little bit techn I would 
point out first of all that in conjunction with the exis one year 
statute of limitation, this poses a very substantial burden on the 
claimant, because the statute is not tolled while all of this is going 
on. If you begin to back up and ask, how much t does it take to 
get the request in, to have the service of process, to have the re-
sponse in, and then just set up the panel, to go through all of the 
pre-hearing discovery, you are liable to conclude that the claimant 
has to file this request within a matter of weeks of the time of the 
initial alleged injury. We think that is a serious problem that ought 
to be dealt with. A second point here is the discovery issue. You 
are liable to have multiple defendants, I don't see from a judicial 
point of view how you can possibly complete all of the discovery. You 
may have two or three doctors, an anesthesiologist, an ambulance driver, 
and a hospital. The time frame poses serious considerations. Finally, 
here I raise the question, how realistic is it to expect doctors and 
lawyers to provide pro bono service, quite aside from the bias issue. 
And I think that is a very substantial issue that you have raised 
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The last point I would like to make is with to question 
number four. The exper other states, I would point out there 
are some very s ificant differences in the Arizona statute which 
avoids many of the that the statute has. It would only add 
that the National Center for State Courts at the request of the Arizona 
Medical Assoc ion evaluat the effectiveness of the 
Arizona statute, has been in ion for four years. That re-
port should be fina ized the end of December of this year. Thank 
you, Mr Chairman. If I can answer any I would be to. 
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CHAIRJI.IAN FENTON: you talk about time away from your 
office? 
MR. MART: No, I am talking about hard cost, jury fees, 
witness fees, expert fees, in any type of malpractice case. 
CHAIRJiAN FENTON: That you have to pay and can lose if you 
don't win. 
MR. MART: Right. For example, I have not tried a medical 
malpractice case since December of 1978. Fortunately I won that case. 
I had $25,000 in costs. Every other case has settled. And I have 
settled them quite regularly and you make a heck of a lot more money 
settling than going into court and that is the nuts and bolts of 
it. There are a small number that do go on to trial. I think the 
system should air those cases. They are not the frivolous lawsuit. 
If they were frivolous, the summary judgment procedure would eliminate 
them. 
Another great threat to the lawyer is the malicious prosecu-
tion cases. And there is getting to be a great frequency of those in 
the courts. In fact, I am sure it will be the subject of some sort of 
legislation in the near future because of the problems it is creating 
on the judicial system. As it stands now, the frivolous case is weeded 
out. It is the case that goes to trial, and it is true that nine out 
of ten are lost, it is because you have expert testimony on both sides 
of the issue and the natural tendency of jurors is more toward the 
defense than the plaintiff. When I talk to a client about settling 
a case, I spend about an hour of my time just talking about the prob-
lems of winning in clear cut cases, where I have strong witnesses from 
university centers who still will not necessarily carry the day in 
front of a jury on a very strong case. The risks are just against the 
malpractice litigant. They are foolish to go to trial. But I think 
that the system can affort it. 
If we look at the statistics, the number of cases that went 
to trial that resulted in verdicts of more than $30,000 was 13 cases 
in 1979. That figure is from the statistics from the Board of Medical 
Quality, that have to be recorded. About nine out of ten cases are 
lost, so if we do a little mathematics we are talking about approxi-
mately 150 cases throughout the whole state that are actually being 
tried, that are taking up judicial time. My own practical experience 
is I settle more than 20 cases as compared to every time I go to trial 
in a medical malpractice case. I would almost say a lot more in the 
way of statistics. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Jim, I don't quarrel with you. I under-
stand what you are say1ng. But there are also quite a few cases that 
consume a lot of judicial time by virtue of going through various 
stages, then settle late. You are talking about those that actually 
go to trial. 
MR. MART: I agree, but as the Judicial Council witness in-
dicated, the court time in the cases that don't go to trial is fairly 
minimal. Usually the first time the court gets involved, except on 
some discovery motions, -- really the competent practitioners don't 
fight great battles on discovery bccnus0 they are costly. You can 
make et frivolous motion, but you are just wasting your time and a lot 
of money. There is that practical side of it. 
It just seems to me that we are imposing, by a screening 
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panel, a very costly procedure and I agree with the statements about 
the cost of the courts, but the cost to the doctors and the litigants 
is just immense. And I say just to the doctors, not the insurance 
company. A very impressive witness in my mind was Dr. Berggreen. He 
is now doing principally defense work. These screening panels would 
be just a joy to the defense bar. In those states where they have 
screening panels, and my only personal experience has been with Nevada, 
but I have had feedback from other attorneys as to how they work and 
particularly we get a lot of feedback about the Nevada system, there 
is no such thing as settlement in a medical malpractice case until you 
have completed this screening panel procedure. The doctor may as well 
take a shot there and see what happens. It is not binding on him. If 
it comes out nonliability or not meritorious, whatever the standard 
they are using, the cases generally would disappear. Then they go 
ahead and they fight the liability cases. I mentioned on the way 
over here to Jim Frayne that one experience that I had in a case that 
I was associated with where the panel in Nevada found that it was a 
meritorious case, they sent him over to their medical society to 
a witness as Dr. Berggreen indicated, and the witness refused to support 
the panel. He came in eventually as a witness for the defense, and 
there was a defense verdict in the case. Ralph Drayton came in behind 
him, and during Dr. Berggreen's testimony he started repeating a similar 
story that he had heard. And that is what happens. It gives a free 
shot to the defense that is a very costly one. 
Perhaps constructively maybe I can make a suggestion, and 
this is off the top of my head, it is something that I have always 
believed in that I think is not being used adequately by the court 
system, and certainly by the litigants and the insurance companies, it 
is a better use of the settlement conference procedure that we have and 
at a more meaningful time. As stands now, we don't have a mandatory 
settlement conference, but most courts sort of impose a sort of manda-
tory conference whereby at least you are dragged in a room with the 
judge and somebody starts talking back and forth and they are by and 
large effective in the average case. Almost all these occur about a 
month to two weeks and in some counties maybe a week before trial. It 
is at a stage where a considerable amount of litigation costs have 
already been expended. In the medical malpractice case, many times 
the ability to settle the cases at figures that make sense to every-
body, kind of evaporates away because of the delay. A week before a 
medical malpractice case, I can't afford to settle the case, I have 
gone out and spent -- it's not that I can't afford it but my price 
settlement has to take into account the cost to my client in part. 
So, one of the suggestions would be to incorporate into this settle-
,nent conference procedure, in the medical malpractice cases, a settle-
ment judge who gets involved in that case, maybe at a six month inter-
val, who then follows up with the settlement conference before trial 
that isn't settled and use that procedure as a method of getting the 
people together at the early stages. The problem of settlement from 
the insurance companies' point of view in the early stage is that they 
are not educated about their own case. I am scheduled to go to trial 
at the end of this month in a case in which they just absolutely said 
there was no liability, yet they cannot-- it is all based on x-rays. 
Right now the defense attorneys are conceding to me that they don't 
have a ghost of a chance. I have two of the foremost experts out of 
Stanford. They can't even disclose a radiologist that can interpret 
the films differently than ours, yet the 90 day letter did not help. 
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I know the doctor in that case, a very reputable fine doctor, who I 
know through feedback from other doctors wants that case settled. 
That case should have been settled long ago, but we have to go through 
all the steps of these procedures. So a stronger settlement procedure 
would be the place that I would aim it. If you want to rid yourself 
of those 6 percent of the cases and get those cases settled, get them 
settled in the early stages when people can be practical with good 
strong settlement judges. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Doesn't L. A. have an earlier settlement 
conference? 
MR. MART: 
are probably talking 
Sacramento we do get 
half. 
I am not familiar with L.A., but by early you 
three years as opposed to five. You see, in 
to trial occasionally in a year or a year and a 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Doesn't it take quite a while for all of 
your discovery proceedings to go through. In a lot of cases you need 
them don't you? 
MR. MART: Yes, that is why I am suggesting like six months. 
Normally here 1s what we do. We file a lawsuit. In a relatively short 
period of time we take the defendant doctor's deposition; they take our 
parties deposition -- at that point the case by and large evolves into 
an expert fight. And at that point in most cases I will go see doctors 
I know locally who will not testify and will tell me about the case. 
And I know the merits of the case. Maybe I have my medical research 
done. I am prepared to talk settlement in that case. At that point 
I don't need to have my testifying expert. And the same is true with 
the defense. They get their consultations, not their final ones in 
the early stages. Everybody ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why don't they want to talk about settle-
ment when they have all those dollars, potential dollars, in costs 
that they may have to pay in the end? 
MR. MART: I think the main thing is that -- and this is why 
settlement conferences are valuable -- that it is a problem inherent 
in the advesary system for the guy to say, "Let's talk settlement." 
They really do get stuck up on the etiquette of it. And many times 
it is the laziness of the legal profession. I don't mind being crit-
ical of our profession. I have times where I will walk out of a 
plaintiff deposition, and I know this happens on my side of the fence 
and by me perhaps too many times -- my experience being with defense 
attorneys -- and I say to them, "Look, you've seen everything here. 
You know what I am going to be able to produce. Now let's sit down 
and discuss this case." He'll say, "Well I haven't had an expert re-
view it." "Well get an expert to review it and then let's get together. 
Why wait till the settlement conference?" But the case tails away be-
cause nobody bothers to do anything. If you have to go to a settle-
ment conference, the conscientious attorney, and there are a few you 
know, will try, maybe they don't go up to the level that they should, 
but maybe we are all being idealists when we expect those things. 
The settlement conferences,particularly in .the early stages, do force 
the attorney, just like the Certificate of Merit, to do his homework, 
to do his job. Most of us are fairly busy people. And you know we 
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put off things. I am sure in your profession as a legislator there 
are times where you know the priorities as to what has to be done is 
what you do. So, I really think the settlement conference procedure 
that becomes more effective may be really the solution. I would take 
that step before I would set up a bureaucracy of a whole new screening 
panel. And I do have to say that we are being exceedingly naive if we 
feel we are going to have them serve without compensation. I serve as 
an arbitrator under the compulsory arbitration and apparently I was 
the second in being chosen by the various attorneys this last year, one 
defense attorney had a couple more than I, and I get paid but I lose 
money even though I am getting paid. I don't mind. There are some of 
us that will serve. Who is going to serve? On the plaintiffs side you 
are going to have the officers of the CTLA. A very biased bunch. You 
are not going to get impartiality there. ~fuo are you going to get out 
of the medical profession to serve without pay? You are going to get 
only the ardent hater of the medical malpractice and lawyers that are 
going to be willing to dedicate their time. So you are going to have 
to put up money. And it is going to be expensive. And it is not going 
to be two and three hours, these hearings. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What we should do is mandate an expert 
expediter in all the courts, one of the judges and give him a club. 
MR. ~1ART: Well, you really want to know the ultimate answer? 
But I am not sure the Legislature or I as a taxpayer are willing to 
do it. We need to set up an effective statewide peer review. Take it 
away from the local hospitals and the local medical staffs, and have 
objective people doing peer review. And as an auxilliary of their peer 
review they also can make recommendations concerning medical malpractice. 
You build in a whole new bureaucracy and I am not too sure that's ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You can do the same thing with the legal 
profession, we have malpractice ... 
MR. ~~RT: No question. In fact one of the things, one com-
ment that I have written down here to emphasize this is let's assume 
I have a serious case, where there is a death, or there is a disability, 
a person isn't going to work the rest of their life, I guarantee you I 
am not going to spend two or three hours in front of some panel to pre-
sent that case with the risk that it is going to a jury with no li-
ability. I am going to bring out all my guns. And it is unfair that 
I have to expose all my guns at that stage of the case, but I know 
about legal malpractice because my insurance rates are going up and I 
don't want my client going down the street a month later when she has 
a no liability finding and saying to me, "V.Tell, why didn't you bring 
in Doctor so-and-so from Stanford or whatever." Ultimately maybe we 
will have to do something more dramatic, but the Legislature has been 
very, very effective in the legislation that they have passed. Some 
of it I don't like but it has been effective and fortunately in some 
parts the courts have helped this in terms that some of the zeal that 
went beyond our constitutional framework, we always have that back-
ground, but it has been helpful. So let's give it more time. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much. Bob Uyeyama. 
MR. BOB UYEYAMA: ~r. Chairman, my name is Bob Uyeyama and 
I am acting County Clerk of Sacramento County and I am representing 
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the County Clerk's Association. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You are very unhappy with this because it 
is going to give you more work, right. I don't mean to suggest this 
is not important because it's o~ten when changes are made they forget 
that they are mandating additional administrative work for people in-
volved in handling the cases. 
MR. UYEYAMA: Well, the County Clerks Association would like 
to go on record opposing this bill, simply because it creates addi-
tional work on the part of the county clerks throughout the state. 
And I would like to incorporate into my testimony the letter dated 
September 10, 1980, by J. s. Simpson.2 
This bill requires a clerk of the superior court to accept 
and file all requests for hearing claims filed by plaintiffs for seek-
ing damages as a result of medical malpractice. The clerks are re-
quired to number each document, file endorsed copies and put them in 
the file. And this would create additional work on the part of the 
county clerk. It also requires that the county clerk mail a copy of 
the request to the physician and s-urgeon by registered mail, return 
receipt requested. This again would be costly and the county clerk 
would have to bear this cost. The county clerk must also notify the 
complainant in the event that no receipt d!s returned, another addi-
tional work on the part of the county clerk. This bill provides that 
the physician and surgeon may file a response why he or she is not 
liable to the complainant. Again, this recruires additional work on 
the part of the cierk. This bill provides --that the hearing shall be 
scheduled as soon as possible after the screening panel is formed; 
however, the bill does not specify who shall schedule the hearing nor 
does it specify whether a notice shall be given. It is presumed that 
the county clerk will perform these tasks. And this bill provides 
that any relevant evidence shall be admitted. And again, it is pre-
sumed that the medical records will be introduced into evidence at 
these screening panels and there's no provisions for disposition of 
that documentary evidence. This bill requires the screening panel to 
render a decision within 10 days of the end of the hearing. Although 
not specified by the bill, it is assumed that the clerk shall mail the 
decision to the parties, another additional task by the clerk. And 
lastly, this bill provides that a complaint may be filed within 60 
days of the date the decision is rendered, whether the panel determines 
that there is liability' or whether there is no liability. And before 
the clerk can accept the complaint filing, the clerk must determine 
whether or not it is timely. This would again require the clerk to 
determine when the decision was rendered. More additional work on 
the part of the clerk. 
CHAI~N FENTON: This bill would keep you hopping. 
M~. UYEYAMA: That's correct, Mr. Fenton. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, some of the other witnesses brought 
up the point. You would be given some discretionary duties. Making 
those determinations could get you in a mess of trouble too, I imagine. 
2 Appendix B 
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MR. UYEYAMA: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much, Bob. 
HR. UYEYAMA: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Mr. Simoni. Our last ~tli tness. 
MR. RALPH SIMONI: Mr. Chairman and members. I am Ralph 
Simoni, represent1ng the State Bar Committee on the Administration of 
Justice. I would like to preface my. comments by stating that this is 
the position of the State Bar Committee on the Administration of Jus-
tice, and not that of the Board of Governors. They have not reviewed 
this measure or the concept of medical malpractice screening panels. 
If the bill is introduced, they certainly will. 
CAJ generally considers medical malpractice screening panels 
as adverse to the interest of the litigants, both the plaintiff and 
defendant, with no corresponding benefit to either party or to the 
court system. Rather than limit or impede litigation, it is quite 
possible that medical malpractice screening panels would actually in-
crease litigation on such issues as the extent of discovery, et cetera. 
In essence, what they would do is superimpose upon the regular litiga-
tion process these additional procedures which both parties would be 
required to go through. 
I think the crux of the issue has basically been brought 
forward by some of the preceeding witnesses in opposition to this 
measure. That is basically the discovery process. I think that's 
probably the most important. This bill would provide for a very 
limited form of discovery. It should be noted that discovery is es-
sential to the development of the case of the parties. Assemblyman 
Greene testified that only 6 percent of the medical malpractice cases 
that are filed actually go to trial. There are many reasons for this 
but I would propose that the most important reason would be that the 
discovery has eliminated many of the cases that did not have the suf-
ficient facts in order to take it to trial and counsel has either set-
tled or dropped the particular case. 
There are a couple of points that have not been brought up. 
With respect to the requirement that the person who is medically in-
jured file a request that a screening panel hear a claim for damages, 
I assume that it is erroneous draftsmanship and probably was meant to 
be a claim for liabilities, since that is what we were discussing here. 
: think there are going to be many issues raised with respect to what 
the request would consist of. These would be issues that would be 
brought before a law and motion calendar similar to an issue with re-
spect to the sufficiency of pleadings. It is important to note that 
merely upon a request, the court would be required to establish and 
set up a medical malpractice screening panel. There is no abi~ity to 
preclude this or short circuit that particular setting up of the panel. 
It could lead to situations where vexatious lawsuits were filed or 
vexatious requests were filed and you would not have the ability such 
as a demurrer or other procedural mechanisms to actually preclude the 
establishing of the panel. 
The chairman has discussed the problems with respect to the 
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impartiality and the composition of the panel. We would agree with 
him wholeheartedly. I think the most crucial concern in addition to 
discovery, is with respect to the evidentiary standard which sets up 
the standard providing for any sort of relevant evidence shall be 
admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons 
are accustomed to rely on in the conduct of serious affairs. This 
standard totally lacks any judicial consistency. It would obviously 
lead to a considerable amount of litigation. It should be important 
to note that this evidentiary standard, as elusive as it is, would 
govern the admissibility of any decision of the screening panel at a 
trial on the merits of the case. In essence, what we would be doing, 
we would be elevating this screening panel composed of a judge, an 
attorney, a physician or a surgeon to the status of an expert witness 
without any ability to qualify or determine whether they are. I be-
lieve the Chairman adequately stated that this would in essence per-
mit the two competing professions, that is the legal profession and 
the medical profession, to confron themselves on a different level 
with the hopes that one of them would prevail with the decision of 
the screening panel which could then be introduced as expert testimony 
in the trial itself. 
Another issue of primary concern would be the practical con-
cern of counsel concerning the relative statute of limitations with 
respect to causes of action against health care providers. This bill 
basically requires that upon the rendering of a decision by the med-
ical malpractice screening panel, the party would have 60 days in 
which to file a complaint. I would just point out that the Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 340.5 provides for a three years statute of 
limitations for the filing of a complaint. And I am not sure how a 
court or counsel could reconcile the 60 day period provided for in 
AB 2919 with the present three year statute of limitations for causes 
of actions. I believe the prior witnesses have discussed the issues 
concerning the unconstitutionality, which this Committee should also 
consider very seriously. I have no further comments, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much, Ralph. Thank you 
all very much. It has been quite interesting to hear about all these 
points. The hearing is now adjourned. 
# # # # # # 
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Hon. Jack Fenton, rman 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
4112 State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Fenton: 
'!'he foll comments are made response 
to a number of s fie ques AB 2919 raised 
by your Principal Consultant, Mr. Rubin Lopez, in his 
letter of September 26, 1980. 
Ques. #1. This question can best be answered 
by the California al Lawyers. 
Ques. #2A. The proposed screening of malpractice 
claims would not be a more economical 
method of handling malpractice cases 
for a variety of reasons: 
1. Expensive New Nonjudicial System Required. 
This measure res the es shment of an 
entirely new, nonjudicial procedure, in addition to, 
not in lieu of, the existing judi al process. More 
specifically, a separate, non-j , administrative 
system is required. Documents are to be filed, copied, 
and noticed. are to be filed. Attorney and 
doctor eligibi lists are to be developed and 
maintained for the selection of panels. Prehearing 
discovery motions are to be calendared and argued. 
Sessions of screening panels are to be calendared, 
hearings to be held and findings made in each case. 
All of this is nonjudicial nature. Yet, judicial 
staff, including judges, are required to assume these 
responsibilities. 
2. Duplicates Discovery 
Discovery rights, under California law, are quite 
extensive. This proposal limits the discovery in medical 
malpractice cases to such matters "as are probably 
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necessary for the hearing. " Personal injury cases, 
and medical malpractice cases in particular, depend 
upon extensive discovery. The establishment of a 
separate, more limited, and vague standard for discovery 
rights under this nonjudicial screening system, will 
be highly controversial and almost certainly will lead 
to extensive prehearing law and motion discovery 
practices to define the new perimeters for discovery. 
Because this standard is more restrictive, this dis-
covery will not eliminate the need for extensive 
discovery subsequent to the filing of any action. 
It will duplicate existing discovery and will impose 
substantial additional administrative costs. 
3. Duplicates Arbitration 
In cases involving less than $15,000, whether 
under mandatory arbitration or election by plaintiff, 
the required hearings will duplicate existing arbitra-
tion hearings except that a panel of three, instead 
of one, will be involved and, because of limited 
discovery, the panel will have less information 
on which to base a determination of liability than is 
true under existing arbitration. 
4. Needlessly Forces Expenditure of Judicial Resources. 
Generally speaking, approximately 6% of personal 
injury cases ever go to trial. While there is some 
court time involved through law and motion calendars, 
on discovery, for example, by and large, 94% of these 
cases settle with virtually no judicial time expended 
on them. By contrast, this proposal requires the 
expenditure of extensive judicial time, through a 
nonjudicial process, in each and every case. This 
is an expensive proposition. 
Ques. #2B. Extensive costs would be incurred 
in using the proposed prescreening 
process. 
1. The clerical tasks outlined in 2A. above are similar 
in many respects to the administrative duties associated 
with existing arbitration. An average of $25 per case 
is the estimated cost of administering an arbitration 
proceeding. AB 2919 involves some additional filing 
and notice requirements not required in arbitration 
proceedings plus start-up costs. Accordingly, $30 
per case would seem to be a reasonable cost estimate. 
To process an estimated 8000 claims per year against 
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physici 
year. 
at $3 each would cost 
October 10, 1980 
40,000 per 
2. A judge, in his as an , is to hear 
all prehearing matters re ve to discovery. The 
average time for each law and motion related 
to discovery, in personal injury cases, is estimated 
at 9 to 13 With a j and clerk 
at the discovery , the average cost is estimated 
to be $15 to $22 per case. Annual costs for this item, 
based on an estimated 8000 claims per year, would total 
$120,000 to $176,000 per year. This cost could be 
substantially understated because of the limited and 
vague standard for discovery under this proposal. 
3. A judge acts as an arbitrator during the hearing by 
the three member panel. The de ion by the panel 
is limited to determining the existence or absence 
of liability. In addition, the proposal provides 
that "the findings of the panel" are to be admissible 
at trial and are to be treated as expert testimony. 
It is estimated, based on arbitration experience, 
that a three member panel will require from one to two 
hours per case to reach a decision on the existence 
or absence of liability. If "findings" are required, 
2 1/2 hours would seem a more reasonable figure. 
The costs of a judge and clerk, with necessary operating 
supplies and a h room would total $104 per 
hour, per th an estimated 8000 h 
per year the total cost would be from $816,000 to 
$1,632,000. If "findings" were required the cost 
would be $2,040,000 per annum. 
4. A judge participating in a panel cannot preside at 
any subsequent hearings or trial of the same case. 
This may result in assignment problems for some courts. 
The cost of assigning a superior court judge to another 
county estimated to be $220 per day, including 
per diem and travel. If 6% of malpractice cases go 
to trial and the average trial is two days, then the 
annual cost would be $211,200 (6% x 8000 x 2 days x 
$220). If only one half of these cases required 
an assigned judge (in other words, every 38th medical 
malpractice case), the annual cost would be $105,600. 
~ This California Department of Insurance figure, 
based on 1979 statistics, is believed to be a conserva-
tive estimate of annual claims. 
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Cost Summary 
Administrative Costs 
Discovery-prehearing 
Hearing panel 
Assignments 
$ 240,000 - $ 
120,000 -
816,000 -
105,600 -
240,000 
176,000 
2,040,000 
105,600 
Estimated Annual Costs $1,281,600 - $2,561,600 
Ques. #2C. The proposed screening process would not 
appear to result in a more expeditious 
handling of malpractice cases. To 
the degree that a panel determination 
on liability dissuades a potential 
plaintiff from filing an action at 
all, there could be fewer cases 
actually filed but there is no bar 
to the filing of an action whatever 
the determination by the panel may 
be. The basic reason that the pro-
posed screening process would not 
expedite the handling of malpractice 
cases is specified in 2A. above. 
The proposed nonjudicial system 
duplicates, it does not replace, 
much of the existing judicial system. 
Accordingly, all of the normal processes 
and procedures still have to be followed. 
Ques. #2D. and 3. 
Substantial additional burdens are 
placed on the courts under the proposed 
pretrial screening system and several of these 
burdens raise signi cant constitutional 
issues. 
1. Initially, this proposal requires the clerk of the court 
to determine whether a pleading is a claim for damages, 
whether it is against a physician and surgeon, and 
whether it is based on a medical injury. If it meets 
these conditions, it can not be filed unless the claim 
has been heard and decided by the screening panel. This 
determination by the clerk requires the exercise of 
discretion and is not a proper function for a clerk. 
To make such a determination, a pleading would have to 
be read, or scanned, and legal conclusions drawn as 
to whether these specific conditions were met. This 
type of duty requires training not possessed by clerks, 
clearly exceeds a ministerial role, and could raise 
-33-
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issues concerning legal li 
determination were made. 
lity if an erroneous 
2. The imposition o£ nonjudicial duties on judges and 
other judicial personnel is unconstitutional as a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
Article III, Section 3, California Constitution. 
All of the additional duties imposed on the clerk and 
on judges by this bill, are prefiling duties. As no 
action has yet been filed to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the court, arguably, all of these duties - establish-
ment/administration of a nonjudicial prefiling system, 
prehearingdiscovery, and panel hearings - are unconsti-
tutional as they require the judicial branch of government 
to engage in nonjudicial duties. 
3. This proposal gives unfair advantage to medical 
malpractice cases. Immediately upon the filing of a 
request for a screening panel, the clerk and a judge 
are required to perform a series of specified actions 
ending with a determination by a three member panel 
as to whether or not liability exists. Thus, without 
regard to hundreds, perhaps, thousands of other backlogged 
cases, the court is required to undertake this substan-
tial nonjudicial activity at the expense of its existing 
caseload. Whether this type of preferential treatment 
rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation 
is a matter for conjecture. It certainly seems to 
bestow a grossly unfair benefit on a select category 
o£ cases by giving them, in essence, the benefit of 
a prefiling advisory opinion. 
4. Conversely, an argument can be made that the imposition 
of these additional procedural barriers to the filing 
of one class of case only denies claimants with such 
causes of action equal protection under the law. 
Ques. #3. Three additional points appear to 
fall within the scope of question 
#3. First, this proposal, in 
conjunction with the existing one 
year statute of limitations for 
personal injury and wrongful death 
cases (CCP § 340) places substantial 
time pressures on a claimant. This 
proposal prohibits filing a medical 
malpractice action without having 
obtained a panel decision on liability. 
The proposal does not toll the statute 
while awaiting the panel's decision. 
To get the requisite decision by the 
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panel and still meet the one year 
statute of limitations, a claimant 
would have to file the request for 
a screening panel almost immediately 
after occurrence of the alleged 
injury or death. That seems an 
unreasonable burden to place on a 
claimant. Secondly, discovery is 
a time consuming process even when 
diligently pursued. The time required 
to complete even the limited discovery 
authorized by this bill could take 
3 to 6 months. Within the context 
of a one year statute of limitations, 
this proposal seems unworkable. 
Finally, how realistic is it to 
believe that doctors and lawyers are 
going to sit, pro bono, on these 
review panels? Under the existing 
mandatory arbitration system, attorney-
arbitrators are paid up to $150 per 
day. This part of the proposal may 
be totally unworkable. 
Ques. #4. The National Center for State Courts, 
Western Regional Office, is currently 
evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Arizona statutes which provide for 
a system of pretrial review of medical 
malpractice cases. This evaluation, 
undertaken at the request of the Arizona 
Medical Association, should be completed 
by the end of December 1980. It 
is worth noting however, that the 
Arizona statute, which was passed in 
1976, differs substantially from the 
proposal embodied in AB 2919. Among 
other differences, the Arizona statute: 
1. Provides for a postfiling review 
of medical malpractice actions; 
2. Provides state reimbursed compen-
sation for the attorney and doctor 
members of the review panel; 
3. Operates within a judicial 
structure that does not have mandatory 
arbitration; 
4. Preserves the same discovery 
rights as otherwise exist under 
-35-
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Arizona lawi and 
5. Does not confer 11 expert testi-
mony11 status on the findings of the 
panel. A pane ' conclusion is to 
be accorded such weight as the jury 
chooses to give it. 
I hope that these comments have been of some 
assistance to you in considering AB 2919. I will be avail-
able during your scheduled hearing for any questions the 
committee may have. 
EAK:mmf 
Sincerely, 
Ralph J. Gampell 
Director 
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APPENDIX B 
RECORDER'S OffiCE 
101 G STREET 
SACRAMENTO, CA 11111!4 
440•113:114 
HEIDI TSCHIRKY 
ASST. COUNTY RECOROIIi:R 
ve 
In 
ty Clerks file a 
wvu1d 
purposes 
the 
receipt re-
mail 
surgeon's 
County Cl to devise a method of 
ignee that a claim has been led, 
prucess i ng discovery 
and nsure that the documents 
addition, erk would set the 
( .6). FurthEr, the Clerk would be 
were admitted (1296.8). 
September 10, 1980 
Hon. Jack Fenton 
6. Sections 1296.9 and 1297.1 require the screening panel to 
decide upon the existence or absence of liability. The record of that 
decision would thereafter be maintained by the County Clerk. Should the 
record show the existence of 1 i ability then the n:gul ar court process 
would begin. However, if it is found there was no liability what would 
become of the records? ~Jould th kept indefinitely the same as court 
records? Or could they be dis 
7. Our final point is of this work would be assumed by 
the County Clerk thout ement. It appears that some counties 
would be required to add s to just handle these matters. If it is 
found that legislation is in cwder to establish this "pre-filing 11 process 
then it is essential that a fee required help defray the expenses. 
Sincerely, 
.tL~. 
J. A. Simpson, Ccunty Clerk-Recorder 
Chairman, Legislative Cornmi rts 
County Clerks' Association 
cc: Bob Hamm, Pres. 
Ed Kerry, Judicia 1 i 
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Legal Issues Arising in the Use of Screening Panels 
Proponents of medical screening panels claim that they are 
a relatively inexpensive means of eliminating the spurious 
claim at a pre-trial stage. However, the use of these 
panels raises several ex legal problems. Three major 
issues have been faced by courts in states where panels 
have been used: · 
( 1) Does the appl ion of a special procedure to 
medical malpractice claims interfere with an 
individual's access to the courts in violation 
of equal protect of the law? 
{2) Does the vesting of a non~j ial panel with 
( 3) 
decision making authority violate constitutional 
doctrines of separation of powers? 
Does the admission 
a subsequent court 
impair a malpract 
trial? 
of the panel's decision in 
proceeding unconstitutionally 
e 1 1 s r to a jury 
A. Access to the Courts 
There is no doubt that when a plaintiff is required 
to submit a malpractice c im to a screening panel 
as a condition precedent to filing suit, his or her 
access to the courts affected. The opponents 
of screening s c im that panels add time and 
expense to litigation, thereby abridging the indi-
vidual's access to the court and right to a jury trial. 
Critics of screening panels contend that both the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Federal 
and State Constitutions are violated. 
In considering these arguments, other jurisdictions 
are split in the conclusions. The equal protec-
tion issue was argued before the Florida Supreme Court 
in Carter v Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1041 (1977). The court up-
held the ity of Florida's screening 
panel procedure on ground that was a valid 
exercise of the state's police powers. The court 
recognized that pre-litigation burden on the claimant 
was severe but that even though that burden 
"reaches the outer limits of constitutional toler-
ance", was a valid 
attempt to a cri s. (Also 
see Comiskey v Ar , 390 N.Y.S. 2d 122 [1976] .) 
However, 1t should be noted that 1980 the Florida 
-42-
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powers theory, courts have compared screening pro-
cedures to necessary pre-trial settlement efforts. 
Further, these courts recognized that the panel's 
decisions were opinions or advisory and not final 
adjudications of the claims. (See Carter v Sparkman 
supra; Attorney General v Johnson, 385 Atl. 2d 57 
(Md. 1978); State ex rel Strykowski v Wilkie, 261 N.W. 
2d 934 [Wis. 1978].) 
C. Admission of the Panel's Decision in a Subsequent Trial 
The statutes of nineteen states make some provision 
for admitting a screening panel's decision into evi-
dence in a subsequent court proceeding. Critics con-
tend that when a screening panel's opinion is offered 
into evidence at trial, the effect is to unfairly 
influence the jury on the ultimate sue of the case, 
thereby denying litigants r to a jury trial. 
Courts have recognized that one of the purposes of ad-
mitting a decision in a trial is to e the jury 
and thus discourage needless 1 medical 
malpractice claims. (See 85 Misc. 
753, 756, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 74 , (1976T:T Nevertheless, 
a number of state courts have upheld provisions which 
authorize admiss of the panel's decision in a sub-
sequent trial. A number of courts have relied on the 
theory that the jury rema capable of determining 
the ultimate questions of liability in spite of the 
admission of the 's decision. 
Even Maryland, where the panel's decision is pre-
sumed to be correct upon admiss , the State 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the state's 
admission provisions. In Attorney General v Johnson, 
supra, the Maryland Supreme Court neld: 
This provision only establishes a rebuttable 
presumption. It cuts off no defense, inter-
poses no obstacle to a 1 contestation of 
all the issues, and takes no question of fact 
from either court or jury. At most, there-
fore, is merely a rule of evidence. It 
does not abridge the right of trial by jury, 
or take away any of its incidents. Nor does 
it in work a denial of due process 
of law: In principle it is not unlike the 
statutes many of the states, whereby tax 
deeds are made prima facie evidence of the 
regularity of the s upon which 
Such statutes 
have been generally sustained [Citations 
omitted.] as have many state and 
-4 -
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AB 2919 AND THE OCTOBER 14 HEARING 
. ] 
Chief 
report of 
at the trial 
a legitimate 
over rules of 
•v~, .. ~istent with the 
by jury. 
states where 
1 llenge, 
of a "malpractice 
lature be 
AB 2919 (Greene) was to be 
9, 1980. At the request of 
ferred to interim study at 
by the Committee on April 
the author,the bill was re-
· 1980 hearing will focus on 
solicit testimony rd 
tive aspects of 
Committee staff 
ing issues: 
October 14, 
In an effort to 
pos and nega-
e screenin~ panels, 
to address the follow-
1. What ving medical mal-
would necessitate the 
establishment of a unique screening procedure? 
Do exis court procedures fail to adequately 
handle malpractice litigation? 
2. would the sc of malpractice claims be a 
more economical method of handling malpractice 
cases? What costs would be involved in using a 
pre-trial screening process? Would a screening 
process result a more ious handling 
of malpractice cases? What additional burden 
is placed on the courts by pre-trial screening 
panels? 
3. What legal issues are raised by establishing a 
medical malpractice ial screening process? 
4. What has been the experience in other states 
where screening panels have been established? 
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EXHIBIT B 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY APRIL 8, 1980 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1979~ REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2919 
Introduced by Assemblyman Greene 
March 6, 1980 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
An act to add Title 9.2 (commencing with Section 1296) to 
Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to health, and 
making an appropriation therefor. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 2919, as amended, Greene (Jud.). Malpractice 
screening panels. 
Under existing law, parties may voluntarily submit civil 
disputes to arbitration. Additionally, existing law requires the 
arbitration of certain claims in certain courts prior to trial. 
This bill would require the pretrial submission of claims 
against physicians and surgeons based on a medical injury to 
a screening panel prior to filing a complaint. The panel would 
be "'composed of a judge, an attorney, and a physician. The 
panel's decision as to nonliability would be binding if a party 
does not request te proceed file a complaint within 60 days, 
in which case the decision would be admissible. The panel's 
decision as to liability would be admissible at trial. The bill 
would enact related provisions. 
Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires 
the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for 
costs mandated by the state. The section also specifies the 
manner for paying the reimbursement and requires any 
-46- ' 98 40 
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1 H~96.2. Ne e:lffiffi fer damages against a physician f:lftd 
2 surgeon because ef a medical injury, ~.vhieh is filed en: et> 
3 ~ Jaauary -:1:-; t98.f.; ~. ee ~ ualess a SCreeaiag 
4 ~ htts heaFd f:lftd decided the e:lffiffi as provided ffi ~ 
5 #He: claim has been heard and decided by a screening 
6 panel as provided by this title. 
7 1296.2. (a) A person seeking to recover. damages 
8 because of a medical injury shall file a request that a. 
9 screening panel hear the claim for. damages with the 
10 clerk of the superior court in which a complaint would 
11 have been filed Such request shall generally state the 
12 type and alleged cause of injuries, and shall set forth the 
13 name and address of the physician and surgeon alleged to 
14 be liable for the injuries. 
15 (b) The clerk shall mail a copy of the request to the 
16 physician and surgeon by registered ma11, return receipt 
17 requested. If no receipt is returned, the clerk shall notifY 
18 the complainant, who shall then give notice to the 
19 physician and surgeon in the manner required for the 
20 service of a summons. A screening panel shall not be 
21 selected until the clerk has received a return receipt for 
22 service by mail or proof of service /Tom the complainant. 
23 (c) The physician and surgeon may file a response 
24 setting forth why he or she is not liable to the 
25 complainant. 
26 (d) The clerk shall notify the parties of the procedures 
27 relating to the screening panel. 
28 1296.3. Within 60 days after a claim subject to this part 
29 is filed, the presiding judge of the court, or such other 
30 judge as is designated by the presiding judge, shall select 
31 a screening panel composed of the following: 
32 (a) That judge. 
33 (b) An attorney selected by the judge from a list 
34 submitted by a local bar assoGiation designated by the 
35 judge. 
36 (c) A physician and surgeon selected by the judge 
37 from a list submitted by a local medical or medical 
38 specialty society. Such physician and surgeon shall be a 
39 recognized specialist or practitioner in the type of 
40 practice involved in the action. 
-48-
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1 1296.4. The physician and surgeon and the attorney 
2 members shall be persons willing to serve without 
3 compensation, and shall not be compensated. 
4 1296.5. The judge shall hear all prehearing matters 
5 relating to discovery. It is the intent of the Legislature 
6 that the hearing should be expeditious and relatively 
7 informal, and therefore that discovery should be limited 
8 to such matters as are probably necessary for the hearing. 
9 1296.6. The hearing shall be scheduled as soon as 
10 possible after the screening panel is formed. 
11 1296.7. The judge shall have the powers of a neutral 
12 arbitrator set forth in Sections 1282.2, 1282.6, and 1282.8, 
13 and the provisions of such sections shall be applicable to 
14 such hearing. 
15 1296.8. The hearing need not be conducted according 
16 to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses. Any 
17 relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of 
18 evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed 
19 to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the 
20 existence of any common law or statutory rule to the 
21 contrary. , 
22 1296.9. The screening panel shall render a decision 
23 within 10 days of the end of the hearing. The decision 
24 shall be limited to the existence or absence of liability. A 
25 dissent may be filed. 
26 1297. If the screening panel determines that there is 
27 no liability, that determination may be reviewed by filing 
28 a: notice ~ a: ~ intends te pFoeeed wtM:t ffte. action 
29 a complaint within 60 days after the decision is rendered. 
30 If no notice i-s fHe6.; ffte decision ~ ee deemed 
31 accepted a:n4 ffte. ee\:ift ~ eftfef' a: judgment ef 
32 dismissaL complaint is filed within 60 days, any cause of 
33 action against the physician and surgeon because of the 
34 alleged injury shall be barred. 
35 1997 .l. H' a: notice ef intent te pFoeeed wtM:t ffte. action 
36 1297.1. If a complaint is filed, the findings of the panel 
37 shall be admissible at trial and shall be treated as expert 
38 testimony. 
39 1297.2. If the screening panel determines that there is 
40 liability, ~ action ~ pFoeeed as otherwise pFovided, 
-49- 98 80 
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1 liabilit~ a complaint may be filed within 60 days and the 
2 findings of the ]:'anel shall be admissible at trial and shall 
3 be treated as expert testimony. 
4 1297.3. The judge who is a member of the screening 
5 panel shall not preside at any subsequent hearing or trial 
6 of the same case. 
7 1297.4. No member of the screening panel shall be 
8 liable for damages for any act or statement made as a 
9 member of the panel. 
10 1297.5. At any time before a panel is formed, a party 
11 may move the ~judge designated pursuant to Section 
12 1296.3 for a transfer of the case to another court as 
,13 otherwise provided by law. 
14 SEC. 2. The sum of dollars ($ ) is 
15 hereby appropriated from the General Fund to the 
16 Controller for allocation and disbursement to local 
17 agencies and school districts to reimburse them for costs 
18 mandated by the state and incurred by them pursuant to 
19 this act. 
0 
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2919 
Introduced by Assemblyman Greene 
March 6, 1980 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
An act to add Title 9.2 (commencing with Section 1296) to 
Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to health, and 
making an appropriation therefor. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 2919, as introduced, Greene ( Jud.). Malpractice 
screening panels. 
Under existing law, parties may voluntarily submit civil 
disputes to arbitration. Additionally, existing law requires the 
arbitration of certain claims in certain courts prior to trial. 
This bill would require the pretrial submission of claims 
against physicians and surgeons based on a medical injury to 
a screening panel. The panel would be composed of a judge, 
an attorney, and a physician. The panel's decision as to 
nonliability would be binding if a party does not request to 
proceed within 60 days, in which case the decision would be 
admissible. The panel's decision as to liability would be 
admissible at trial. The bill would enact related provisions. 
Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires 
the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for 
costs mandated by the state. The section also specifies the 
manner for paying the reimbursement and requires any 
statute mandating the costs to contain an appropriation to pay 
for the costs in the initial fiscal year. This statutory provision 
will be supplemented by a constitutional requirement of 
-51-
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reimbursement effective for statutes enacted on or after July 
l, 1980. 
This bill appropriates an unspecified sum to the Controller 
for allocation and disbursement to local agencies and school 
districts for costs mandated by the state and incurred by them 
pursuant to this act. 
Vote: %. Appropriation: yes. Fiscal committee: yes. 
State-mandated local yes. 
The people of the State of Califomi<l do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. 9.2 ( 
2 1296) is added to 
3 to read: 
3 of the Code of 
with Section 
Procedure, 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ll 
12 
13 
14 
TITLE 9.2. MALPRACTICE PANELS 
1296. In this title, 
meanings indicated, 
requires otherwise: 
terms have the 
the context of their use 
(a) "Screening panel" means 
pursuant to Section 1296.3. 
(b) "Court" means court 
filed or pursuant to 
(c) 
resulting 
the panel selected 
the action is 
1297.4. 
or arising or 
to render health 
16 care. 
17 (d) "Physician and surgeon" means a physician and 
18 surgeon licensed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing 
19 with Section 2000) of Division 2 of the Business and 
20 Professions Code or to Osteopathic 
21 Initiative 
22 1296.1. No claim damages a physician and 
23 surgeon because of a medical injury shall be filed in any 
24 court in this state on or after January 1, 1981, unless the 
25 plaintiff requests in complaint that the be heard 
26 by a screening panel as by title. 
27 1296.2. No claim for against a physician and 
28 surgeon because of a injury, which is filed on or 
29 after l, 1981, tried unless a screening 
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1 panel has heard and decided the claim as provided in this 
2 title. 
3 1296.3. Within 60 days after a claim subject to this part 
4 is filed, the presiding judge of the court, or such other 
5 judge as is designated by the presiding judge, shall select 
6 a screening panel composed of the following: 
7 (a) That judge. 
8 (b) An attorney selected by the judge from a list 
9 submitted by a local bar association designated by the 
10 judge. 
11 (c) A physician and surgeon selected by the judge 
12 from a list submitted by a local medical or medical 
13 specialty society. Such physician and surgeon shall be a 
14 recognized specialist or practitioner in the type of 
15 practice involved in the action. 
16 1296.4. The physician and surgeon and the attorney 
17 members shall be persons willing to serve without 
18 compensation, and shall not be compensated. 
19 1296.5. The judge shall hear all prehearing matters 
20 relating to discovery. It is the intent of the Legislature 
21 that, the hearing should be expeditious and relatively 
22 informal, and therefore that discovery should be limited 
23 to such matters as are probably necessary for the hearing. 
24 1296.6. The hearing shall be scheduled as soon as 
25 possible after the screening panel is formed. 
26 1296.7. The judge shall have the powers of a neutral 
27 arbitrator set forth in Sections 1282.2, 1282.6, and 1282.8, 
28 and the provisions of such sections shall be applicable to 
29 such hearing. 
30 1296.8. The hearing need not be conducted according 
31 to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses. Any 
32 relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of 
33 evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed 
34 to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the 
35 existence of any common law or statutory rule to the 
36 contrary. 
37 1296.9. The screening panel shall render a decision 
38 within 10 days of the end of the hearing. The decision 
39 shall be limited to the existence or absence of liability. A 
40 dissent may be filed. 
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1 1297. If the screening panel determines that there is 
2 no liability, that determination may be reviewed by filing 
3 a notice that a party intends to proceed with the action 
4 within 60 days after the decision is rendered. If no notice 
5 is filed, the decision shall be deemed accepted and the 
6 court shaH 
7 1297.1. If a .. '-"'·""''"' 
8 is filed, findings 
9 trial and shall be ~~" .. "",""'""''~'~ 
10 1297.2. 
11 liability, the action 
12 and the findings the panel be admissible at trial 
13 and shall be treated as expert testimony. 
14 1297.3. The judge who is a of the screening 
15 panel shall not preside any hearing or trial 
16 of the same case. 
17 1297.4. No member of the screening panel shall be 
18 liable for damages for act or statement made as a 
19 member of the panel. 
20 1297.5. At any time before a panel is formed, a party 
21 may move the court for a of the case to another 
22 court as otherwise provided law. 
23 SEC. 2. sum of dollars ( $ ) is 
24 from the General Fund to the 
25 allocation and to local 
26 agencies and school districts reimburse them for costs 
27 mandated by the state and incurred by them pursuant to 
28 this act 
0 
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY Prepared by 
R. R. Lopez JACK R. FENTON, CHAIRMAN 
BILL DIGEST 
BILL: AB 2919 HEARING DATE: 4/9/80 
(As amended 4/8/80) 
AUTHOR: Greene 
SUBJECT: Malpractice Screening Panels 
OBJECTIVE: 
This bill is intended to establish a mandatory pretrial 
screening process to be used in all medical malpractice 
death and injury actions against physicians and surgeons. 
BILL DESCRIPTION: 
Under existing law, parties may voluntarily submit civil 
disputes to arbitration. In addition, last year legis-
lation went into effect which established an experimental 
mandatory arbitration program for all civil cases in which 
the amount in controversy is less than $15,000. 
This bill would require that all medical injury claims for 
damages against a physician and surgeon filed on or after 
January ·1, 1981 be submitted to a screening panel prior to 
trial. Specifically, the bill provides the following: 
1. No complaint for damages based on medical injury 
against physician and surgeon shall be filed 
after January 1, 1981 unless the claim has been 
heard and decided by the screening panel as pro-
vided by this bill. 
2. A person seeking damages because of medical injury 
shall be required to request that the claim be 
heard by a screening panel. The bill also requires 
that the clerk send the physician and surgeon a copy 
of the filed request. No screening panel would be 
selected until the clerk has received acknowledgment 
or proof that the physician was served with the notice. 
(CONTINUED) 
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3. Within 60 days after the claim is filed, the 
presiding judge or a designated judge shall 
select a panel. The panel shall be composed of 
the judge, an attorney from a list submitted by 
a local bar, and a physician and surgeon from a 
list submitted by a local medical society. The 
attorney and physician shall serve without com-
pensation. 
4. The judge shall hear all prehearing discovery 
matters. Although the hearing is intended to 
be informal and technical rules of evidence 
may not apply, the proceeding is to be conduc~ed 
in a manner similar to existing statutory arb1-
tration proceedings. Further, the judge shal~ 
have the st.atutory authority of a neutral arb1-
trator. 
5. The panel shall render a decision limited to the 
existence or absence of liability within 10 days 
of a hearing. A finding of no liability shall 
become final unless within 60 days of the decision, 
a complaint based on the alleged injury or death 
is filed. If no complaint is filed, all sub-
sequent claims are barred. 
6. The judge who sat on the panel would not be 
eligible to hear the matter at trial. 
The bill appropriates an unspecified sum from the General 
Fund for the purposes of this measure. 
SOURCE: 
Author 
SUPPORT: 
Unknown 
OPPOSITION: 
California Trial Lawyers Association 
Judicial Council 
COMMENT: 
1. On July 1, 1979, a mandatory arbitration process for 
all civil cases where the amount in controversy is 
less than $15,000 went into effect. The Judicial 
Council and the Auditor General are to review and 
evaluate the effectiveness of that program. This 
bill would establish a separate screening program for 
(CONTINUED) 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
handling malpractice claims against phys ians and 
surgeons. Would it not be wise to evaluate the 
existing arbitration process to determine if the 
problems this bill seeks to resolve are adequately 
handled by the existing process? Is it sound policy 
to create a separate mandatory screening process for 
cases involving only one group of professionals? 
Further, since existing law requires mandatory arbi-
tration of cases valued at less than $15,000 would 
this bill not subject those cases to two separate 
screening or arbitration systems? Should an amendment 
be offered to prevent the same case from being subject 
to two separate systems? 
This bill would require that the presiding judge or the judge's 
designee sit on the medical malpractice screening panel. 
It also prohibits that judge from hearing the case in 
a subsequent judicial trial. Would this not cause 
administrative problems for smaller courts with few 
superior court judges? Further, the bill specifies 
that the physician and attorney panel members shall not 
be compensated. Is it practical to anticipate that mem-
bers of these professions would be willing to volunteer 
time to serve without compensation? 
This bill would require the screening of all medical 
malpractice claims against physicians and surgeons. 
It then defines physician and surgeon as one licensed 
pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2000) 
of Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code or 
pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act. However, 
Chapter 2 of Division 2 refers to ~hiropractors and 
commences with Section 1000, while Chapter 5, Section 
2000 deals with the Medical Practice Act. It is unclear 
what specific medical professions the author wishes to 
cover in this bill. 
This bill would require the screening process include 
an informal hearing which will be governed by some of 
the statutory provisions dealing with arbitration 
(Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1282.2, 1282.6 and 
1282.8). However,the bill does not specifically guaran-
tee that parties may be represented by counsel at these 
hearings. Should the parties right to counsel at the 
hearing be recognized? 
~is b~ll would.prohibit the filing of any complaint 
1nvolv1ng a cla1m for damages against a physician and 
surgeon because o~ a medical injury, unless the claim 
was heard and dec1ded by a screening panel. Although 
(CONTINUED) 
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not specified by the bill, it is assumed that 
the clerk would be required to reject a com-
plaint which did not contain such a request. 
Would this not exceed the ministerial respon-
sibility of the clerk? 
6. The bill provides that the decision of the screening 
panel would be admissible as expert testimony at any 
subsequent court trial. The opponents of the bill 
claim that to treat the panel's decision as expert 
testimony would be highly prejudicial. Further, op-
ponents claim that since the panel may ignore rules 
of evidence, the admission of the decision may result 
in "expert opinion" at trial which is based entirely 
on inadmissible evidence. 
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EXHIBIT C 
'S STATUTES ESTABLISHING SCREENING PANELS 
Alaska Stat. §09.55.536 (Supp. 1978) 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-567 (Supp. 1979) 
Ark. Stat. Ann. §34-2603 (Supp. 1978) 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ~38-196 (West Supp. 1979) 
El. Code Ann. tit. 18 §6803 (Supp. 1978) 
Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.44 (West Supp. 1979) (Declared 
unconstitutional) 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §671-11 (1976) 
Idaho Code §6-1001 (1979) 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 §58.3 (Supp. 1979) Declared 
unconstitutional) 
Ind. Code §16-9.5-9-2 (1976) 
Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-4901 (Supp. 1979) 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40: 1299.47 (West 1977) 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24 §2802 (Supp. 1979-80) 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §3-2A (Supp. 1979) 
Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 231, §608 (West Supp. 1979) 
Mo. Ann. Stat. §538 020 (Vernon Supp. 1979) (Declared 
unconstitutional) 
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §17-1304 (Supp. 1977) 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §44-2840 (1978) 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §41A. 020 (1977) 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-14 (1978) 
N.J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:21 (1979) 
N.Y. Jud. Law §148-a (McKinney Supp. 1978-80) 
N.D. Cent. Code §32-20.1-01 (Supp. 1979) 
Ohio Rev. Code §2711-21 (Page Supp. 1978) 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §1301.510 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) 
(Declared unconstitutional) 
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0THER STATE'S STATUTES ESTABLISHING SCREENING PANELS (Continued) 
Rhode Island 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
R.I. Gen. Laws §10-19-8 (Supp. 1978) 
Tenn. Code Ann. §23-3409 (Supp. 1979) 
va. Code §8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1979) 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §655.19 (l), (2) (West Supp. 1979) 
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